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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to test the semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis by
analyzing the effects of stock repurchase announcements on stock price. Specifically, is it
possible to earn an above normal return on a publicly traded stock when the firm announces a
stock repurchase? Numerous past studies suggest that with a stock repurchase announcement
goes a positive signal about the company's future, thereby significantly increasing the firm's
stock price. Firms repurchase undervalued stock, thus raising the stock price. According to the
semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis, it is not possible to consistently outperform the
market - adjusted appropriately for risk - by using publicly available information such as stock
repurchase announcements. This type of information should impound stock price szif.ficiently fast
to disallow any investor's earning an above normal risk adjusted return. Evidence here supports
the positive signal associated with the sample stock repurchase announcements examined
Likewise, the study results support the semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis and suggest
the possibility of trading on this information up to 30 days prior to the announcement.
Specifically, for this study the announcement of a stock repurchase·is viewed with a mixed signal,
negative before the announcement and immediate positive reaction afterwards.

INTRODUCTION
A stock repurchase occurs when a company with excess cash buys back stock for any
number of reasons. Once a corporation buys back its stock, it is tenned treasury stock and is
ineligible to collect dividends. Some reasons corporations repurchase stock include: preventing a
hostile takeover, acquiring shares for future distribution for employee options, and for converting
securities. The main benefits from buying back stock are raising the earnings per share on
remaining shares outstanding and eliminating the dividend burden on the shares repurchased.
Likewise, a stock repurchase can be an effective tool used by companies, especially in times of
undervaluation and high taxes to attempt to raise the market price of their stock.

How fast does stock price react to corporate stock repurchase announcements? It follows
that the information embedded in a stock repurchase announcement could be tested to determine
how fast stock price reacts to this news and whether the r;.eaction is weak, semi-strong, or strong
form efficient. ,Previous research suggests that �he fu_ark�t )s semi-strong form efficient with
·, · ' - ·· 1 · >l � -' :, '' ',.., ·
respect to stock repurchase announcements.
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The purpose of this study is to test the market efficiency theory by analyzing the impact
of a sample of 85 stock repurchase announcements on the firms' stock price. Particularly, how
fast does the market price of the firms' stock react to the sample of regular stock repurchase
announcements examined? Using the standard risk adjusted event study methodology, this
research will test whether the announcement of stock repurchases conforms to the semi-strong
form efficient market hypothesis. Evidence here suggests that the market reaction to the stock
repurchase announcement is negative prior to the announcement and positive afterwards.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Companies are permitted to repurchase their stock by most state statues at the discretion
of its directors if the company has a surplus of funds to repurchase the stock (Brudney, 1983).
Companies can purchase· their stock back through privately negotiated purchases, purchases on
the secondary market (like the New York Stock Exchange), or through tender offers. Tender
offer stock repurchase programs are characterized by a solicitation for shares by offering a
premium above market price. Those accepting tender offers are said to tender their stock for
purchase. Companies purchasing their stock back through the secQDdary markets, such as the
New York Stock Exchange, face regulations and restrictions. The main regulation requires
companies to release information pertinent to the stock repurchase ten days after the acquisition
of five percent of the company's outstanding stock. This differs from the tender offer in order to
provide a stable free and open market for the buyer and seller where the extent of their interest in
the transaction is not disclosed (Brudney, 1983).
Regardless of its legal definition, a stock repurchase is a non-routine transfer of cash
from the firm to the stockholder. In addition, according to the efficient-market hypothesis,
repurchase announcement information should be reflected in prices immediately and investors
should not expect to earn a return higher than the normal rate of return as measured by The
Standard and Poor's 500 Index. Stock prices will adjust before an investor has time to trade, even
with awareness of information (Ross, 2005). Efficiency is defined by how fast the market
responds to different types of information: past, public, and all information. Market efficiency is
defined in three forms: weak, semi-strong, and strong form. The market is weak form efficient if
stock price reacts so fast to past information that no investor can earn an above normal return by
acting on such news. Semi-strong form efficiency is satisfied if stock prices immediately reflect
all publicly available information as well as past information. Strong form efficiency is satisfied
if stock prices reflect all information, whether public or private (Ross, 2005).
Another academic camp providing documentation of anomalies questioning market
efficiency adheres to what has recently become known as the behavioral challenge to market
efficiency. That is, not all investors are rational, a critical assumption underpinning the behavior
necessary to make the market efficient. Many investors buy, not necessarily when the stock price
is below its economic value, but when they get their tax refund and sell to raise money for a down
payment on a car. Many overreact based on too few observations driving stock price either down
too low or up too high for extended periods of time. The bubble in internet stocks in the 1990s is
an example. Likewise, others are too conservative, motivating them to delay their reaction to
valid �conomic information too long, resulting in holding winners and losers too long. They
appear to develop an emotional attachment to a position in their portfolio and hold on too long in
the face of significant positive or negative news. Th�se psychological behavioral patterns could
explain the numerous anomalies cited in the finance literature. For a complete review of the
behavioral conditions that impact market efficiency, see Shleifer (2000).

An investor's reaction to a stock repurchase announcement provides a method of testing
efficient market theory against the behavioral challenges cited in the literature. If the stock
repurchase sends a positive si gnal, then firms may use this method to increase the market value.
Thus, the company uses the stock repurchase announcement as an implicit signal to the market
with the objective ofraising the value oftheir stock (Liano, 2003).
There are other reasons why companies repurchase their stock. The most common reason
is excess capital. The company can feel that the stock is undervalued, so the best use of excess
cash is to purchase stock back thereby resulting in higher stock prices for that company. Another
purpose of the repurchase decision is to revise the firm's capital structure. Repurchases can cause
adjustments in fmns' capital structures by increasing leverage and adjusting ownership interest.
Buying in stock reduces the finn's equity while at the same time increases the level of debt in the
capital structure. The increased level of debt (or financial leverage) allows the firm to increase
profitability and earnings per share (Dittmar, 2000). Stock repurchases also result in favorable
tax treatment for the individual investor since any gains are generally taxed at the lower capital
gains rate. Firms that participate in stock repurchases typically have less leverage, poor operating
performance, and slow growth compared to companies that do not purchase back stock.
Research on the impact and efficiency ofstock repurchase announcements on stock price
is mixed. Studies based on large tender offer stock repurchases resulted in an immediate and
significant positive effect on stockholders' wealth (Dielman, 1980). Likewise, Masulis (1980)
suggests stock repurchase announcements illicit si gnificant positive stock price reactions at the
semi-strong level ofmarket efficiency. Comment (1991) argues that there is a positive reaction to
the announcement of a stock repurchase agreement. Through the use of a regression analysis,
Comment defends his position that stock repurchases announcements supports increases in stock
prices. His research supports the idea that a firm's stock price will increase because of the
signaling sent by management that their stock is undervalued.
Using a random coefficient regression, Dielman (1980) investigated the effects of stock
repurchasing on the rates of return on the stock being repurchased. His findings conclude that
open market repurchases resulted in no economic significance with the rate of returns for each
firm studied being negligible (Dielman, 1980). Stewart (1976) discovered that in the short term,
stock prices remain neutral from the effects of the repurchase. His study concludes that the
market remains rather inefficient in regards to the stock repurchase and takes several months for
the benefits of the repurchase to appear. By studying both open market and tender offer
repurchases, Marks (1976) was able to conclude that open market repurchases had no significant
price effect on the market and tender offers had a temporary positive price effect for the length of
the offer. However, Rosenberg (1976) found that tender offer stock repurchases resulted in a
neutral price effect for his sample. Overall, most literature supports the idea that an investor
cannot earn an abnormal return from the announcement ofa stock repurchase. This study extends
previous studies by examining the effects of a sample of 85 stock repurchase announcements on
the firms' stock price to determine ifan investor is able to earn an abnormal return by acting this
type of information.

METHODOLOGY AND STUDY SAMPLE

In order to test the level of market efficiency surrounding a sample of stock repurchase
announcements this study uses the standard event study methodology from the finance literature.
As such, the first goal of the event study is to select either a common event with a single event
date or a common event with different event dates. For the purpose of this study, a common
event with different event dates applies. The common event is the firm's announcement of a

stock repurchase. Since firms make these announcements at random, the dates of the
announcements will differ.
The study selects a sample of companies that have announced a stock repurchase from
http://finance.yahoo.com/ or other business and finance sources. In order to provide the sufficient
number of daily price observations before and after the repurchase announcement to
accommodate the event study methodology, the sample of repurchase announcements is limited
to firms at least a year old. Likewise, the sample of companies announcing the repurchase must
be traded on a major exchange such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, or the AMEX.
Table 1: DESCRIPTION OF STUDY SAMPLE

Ticker
Symbol

KO
MCD
BBT

MPL
GM
BUD

SMP
HCM
STLD
PTIX

IOM

Firm Name

Announcement
Date

Coca-Cola Corporation

April11, 1996

McDonald's Corporation

September29,1998

BB&T Corooration

January27, 1999

Apple Incorporate

July15, 1999

General Motors Corporation

February1,2000

Anheuser-Busch Companies Incorporate

February23, 2000

Standard Motor Products Incorporate
Hanover Capital Mortgage Holdings
Incorporate

March6, 2000

NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
NASDAQ
NYSE
NYSE
NYSE

April20,2000

Steel Dynamics Incorporate

June7, 2000

AMEX

Performance Technologies Incorporate
Iomega Corporation

September8, 2000

Ford Motor Company

WNE

World Wrestling Entertainment Incorporate

September14, 2000

csco
scsc
ESST

ENWV
AVSR
HCC

Jakk's Pacific Incorporate
Cisco System

April23, 2001
September14, 2001
September27, 2001

ESS Technology

October24, 2001

Endwave Corporation

January23, 2002

Avistar Communications Corporation

July1, 2002

HCC Insurance Holdinqs Incorporate

July10, 2002

ENTU
AMWD
COGN
ASVI
AZO
ARBA
ACXM

CoQnos lncoroorate

October3, 2002

ASV Incorporate

October7, 2002

PETD

Petroleum Development

UTEK

ECL

American Woodmark Corooration

AutoZone Incorporate
Ariba Incorporate
Acxiom
Ultratech Incorporate
Ecolab Incorporate

NASDAQ
NYSE

September28, 2000

ScanSource Incorporate

Entrust

NASDAQ

August14, 2000

F

JAKK

Trade
Index

July 29, 2002
September4, 2002

October17, 2002
October22, 2002
November14, 2002
January30, 2003
March13, 2003
March18, 2003

*

NYSE
NYSE
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NYSE

ZLC
PEP
HRLY

Zale Corporation
Pepsico Incorporate
Herely Industries Incorporate

WMT

Wal-Mart

GTIV

Gentiva Health Services Incorporate

BORL
CHKP

ELNK

SYNP
INFA

ELON

ACME

ITIC

Borlan Software Cornoration
Check Point Software Technoloaies
Earthlink Incorporate
Synplicitv
Informatica Corporation
Ecelon Corooration
ACME Communication
Investors Title Companv

PLUS.PK

ePlus Incorporate

GE

General Electric Company

CYMI
OPNT

Cvmer Incorporate
OPNET Technoloaies Incorporate

YHOO

Yahoo! Incorporate

ALOG

Analoaic Corooration

March18,2003
Mav28,2003
Mav 30, 2003
June5,2003
Auaust7,2003
Auaust7, 2003
October28, 2003
Aoril23,2004
Mav 25, 2004
Julv2, 2004
September1, 2004
November8,2004
November11, 2004
November18,2004
December10, 2004
January 27, 2005
January 31,2005
March 24,2005
June7, 2005

VRSN

VeriSiQn Incorporate

HPQ

Hewlett-Packard Company

SSYS

Stratasvs Incorporate

October28, 2005

X

United States Steal Corporation

January31, 2006

BAG

Bank of America Corporation

April 26, 2006

Auaust9,2005
Auaust26, 2005

NKE

Nike lncoroorate

June19, 2006

Audiovox Corporation

Julv10, 2006

STEC

STEC lncoroorate

Julv 10, 2006

Microsoft Corooration

July 20, 2006

voxx
MSFT
ALDA
CPWR
K
ALCO
KFT

WSBC
DNA
NVDA
IBM
BKC
HOME
WGO
JNJ

Aldila lncoroorate

Julv 28,2006

Compuware Corporation

Auaust22,2006

Kelloaa Corooration

December11,2006

Alico lncoroorate

January4, 2007

Kraft Foods lncornorate

February 20, 2007

WesBanco Incorporate

March22,2007

Genentech lncorcorate

Aori120, 2007

NVIDIA Corporation

Mav 21, 2007

International Business Machines

Mav29,2007

Sumer Kina Corooration

June1, 2007

Home Deoot

June19,2007

Winnebaao Industries

Julv 2,2007

Johnson & Johnson

July10, 2007

NYSE
NYSE

NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
. NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NYSE
NYSE
NASDAQ
NYSE
NYSE

COP

ConocoPhillips

July 10, 2007

SHLD

Sears

July 10, 2007

AA

Alcoa

July 12, 2007

TLGD

Tollgrade Communications Incorporate

July 26,2007

Paychex Incorporate

Auqust3,2007

TKLC

Tekelec

August 10, 2007

SAPE

Sapient

Auqust20,2007

Atmel

August27, 2007

Qualcomm Incorporate

AUQUSt27,2007

Chevron Corporation

September27,2007

NYSE
NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
NYSE

HW

Headwaters Incorporate

October22, 2007

NYSE

DELL

Dell Incorporate

December 4, 2007

PAYX

ATML
QCOM

cvx

MRT

Morton's Restaurant Group

Januarv 15, 2008

TRMB

Trimble Navigation Ltd

January23, 2008

NASDAQ
NYSE
NASDAQ

To test semi-strong form market efficiency with respect to public announcements of stock
repurchases and to examine the effect of stock repurchase announcements on stock return around
the announcement date, this study proposes the following null and alternate hypotheses:
H1 0 : The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of firms announcing stock
repurchases is not significantly affected by this type of information on the announcement date.
H1 1 : The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of firms announcing stock
repurchases is significantly positively affected by this type of information on the announcement
date.
H2 0 : The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of firms announcing stock
repurchases is not significantly affected by this type of information around the announcement
date as defined by the event period.
H2 1 : The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of firms announcing stock
repurchases is significantly positively affected around the announcement date as defined by the
event period.
The announcement date (day 0), is the date of the firm's announcement of the stock
repurchase. The required historical financial data, the fmns' stock prices and the corresponding
time matched S&P 500 index values for each observation for the event study, will be obtained
from the internet website http://finance.yahoo.com/. The historical stock prices of the sample
companies announcing stock repurchases, and the corresponding S&P 500 index values, for the
event study duration of -180 to +30 days (with day -30 to day +30 defined as the event period
and day O the announcement date) were obtained. The holding period returns of the companies
(R) and the corresponding S&P 500 index (Rm) for each day in this study period were calculated
using the following formula:

or

Current daily stock return = (current day close price - previous day close price)
previous day close price
Current daily S&P 500 return = (current day close price - previous day close price)
previous day close price

A regression analysis was performed using the actual daily return of each company (dependent
variable) and the corresponding S&P 500 daily return (independent variable) over the pre-event
period (day -180 to day -31) to obtain the required alpha and beta coefficients.
Table 2: ALPHAS AND BETAS OF SAMPLE STUDY

Firm

KO
MCD

BBT
MPL

GM

BUD

SMP
HCM

STLD
PTIX

IOM

F

\f-J\NE

JAKK

csco
scsc

ESST
ENWV
AVSR
HCC
ENTU

AMWD

COGN
ASVI
AZO
ARBA

ACXM

UTEK
PETD
ECL
ZLC
PEP
HRLY
WMT
BORL
GTIV
CHKP

Alpha
-0.000997896
0.001452809
-0.002192372
0.001635307
-0.000335242
-0.000450786
-0.002754333
0.000270621
-0.0022766
0.001205689
0.001901318
-0. 002549631
0.001159044
0.001144381
-0.000298548
0.002083845
0.007634321
-0.002097398
-0. 002649402
-0.000362124
0.002700623
0.000844081
0.000222903
-0.001274543
0.001961116
0.001888536
0.001519324
0.00061807
0.000731597
0.000867974
0.000194213
0.000834711
-0.000285157
-8.77E-05
-0.001323831
0.039151363
-6.07E-05

Beta
0.367242654
0.687107057
1.020852623
1.08772784
0. 735931552
0.449482927
0.169517558
0.017018403
0.607929068
1.522388945
0.584998466
0.263181509
0.377814878
1.122401369
2.088965647
0.768038663
1.329888342
0.254261582
0.519862965
0
1.773714321
0.669685843
0.134231009
-0.0170995
0.617335438
1.440209211
0.788341133
1.167988981
0.194305498
0.80791061
0.568464184
0.335456028
0.365310341
0.716318717
1.107039257
1.934826931
1.156327111

ELNK

SYNP
INFA

ELON

ACME

ITIC
PLUS.PK
GE

CYMI

OPNT

YHOO
ALOG

VRSN
HPQ
SSYS

X

BAC
NKE

voxx

STEC
MSFT
ALDA
CPWR

K

ALCO
KFT
WSBC

DNA
NVDA
IBM
BKC

HOME
WGO

JNJ
COP
SHLD
AA
TLGD

PAYX
TKLC
SAPE

ATML
QCOM

cvx

0.001011716
-0.000723645
-0.001833592
-0.00155802
-0.002127432
0.000605365
-0.000215631
0.00078211
-0.001218191
-0.003441312
0.00026925
0.000168265
-0.001752097
0.001296649
-0.001053431
0.001042672
0.000492901
-0.000223904
-0.00019708
0.002225553
-2.33144E-05
-0.001467573
-0.000829701
0.000308135
0.000184364
-0.000589103
-0.000772212
-0.000336862
0.001240226
0.001071257
0.0020237
-0.000790249
-0.001226906
-0.000396381
0.001098237
-0.001003899
0.001179264
0.001361676
0.000308601
-0.001603313
0.000900494
-0.000289634
0.000463236
0.000909759

1.77653952
-0.44473305
1.96403177
1.499934977
0.306104413
-0.31532446
0.148022083
0.765171714
1.825537872
1.218524707
1.240890066
1.204349244
1.291257783
0.485182193
0.731744904
1.596426129
0.660545987
0.460833445
1.413967612
0.382100553
0.484329017
0.962706766
0.600586682
0.370058593
0.677765135
0.526390178
1.231918238
0.348806663
1.543165532
0.584660448
0.66095009
1.126490832
0.987777988
0.452838794
0.80235576
0.718915771
0.968170257
0.710662139
0.66602998
0.829168159
0.977706477
0.736844168
0.553397838
0.83030035

HW
DELL
MRT
TRMB

-0.003225915
-0. 000143209
-0.002895692
0.000476247

0.934231501
0.812796612
0.893510663
0.918065855

In order to get the normal expected returns, the risk-adjusted method was used. The expected
return for each stock, for each day of the event period (day-30 to day +30) was calculated as:
E(R)= alpha + Beta <Rm),
Rm is the return on the market (S&P 500 index).
Then, the excess return (ER) was calculated as: ER= Actual Daily Return (R) - Expected Return
E(R). Average Excess Returns (AER) was calculated (for each day from -30 to +30) by
averaging the excess returns for all the finns for the given day. AER = Sum of Excess Returns
for the given day / number of firms in sample. Cumulative AER (CAER) was calculated by
adding or accumulating the AERs for each day from -30 to +30. Graphs of AER and Cumulative
AER are plotted for the event period to display how the market performs each day of the event
period (day -30 to +30).
QUANTITATIVE TESTS AND RESULTS
Did the market react to the stock repurchase announcements? Was the information
surrounding the event significant? A'priori, one would expect there to be a significant difference
in the Actual Average Daily Returns (Day -30 to Day +30) and the Expected Average Daily
Returns (Day-30 to Day +30) if the information surrounding the event impounds new, significant
information on the market price of the firms' stock (see AER graph in Chart 1 below). If a
significant risk adjusted difference is observed, then we support our hypothesis that this type of
information did in fact significantly either increase or decrease stock price. To statistically test
for a difference in the Actual Daily Average Returns (for the firms over the time periods day -30
to day +30) and the Expected Daily Average Returns (for the finns over the time periods day -30
to day +30), we conducted a paired sample t-test and found a significant difference at the 5%
level between actual average daily returns and the risk adjusted expected average daily returns
over the event period. Results here support the alternative hypothesis H2 1: The risk adjusted
return of the stock price of the sample of firms announcing stock repurchases is significantly
discemable around the announcement date as defined by the event period. This finding supports
the significance of the information around the event since the market's reaction was observed.
Is it possible to isolate and observe the sample's daily response to the announcement of a
stock repurchase from day -30 to day +30? If so, at what level of efficiency (weak, semi-strong,
strong form according to efficient market theory) did the market respond to the information and
what are the implications for market efficiency? Another purpose of this analysis was to test the
efficiency of the market in reacting to the repurchase announcement. Specifically, do we observe
weak, semi-strong, or strong form market efficiency as defined by Fama (1970) in the efficient
market hypothesis? The key in the analysis or tests is to determine if the AER (Average Excess
Return) and CAER (Cumulative Average Excess Return) are significantly different from zero or
that there is a visible graphical or statistical relationship between time and either AER or CAER.
See AER and CAER graphs in Charts 1 and 2 below. T-tests of AER and CAER both tested
different from zero at the 1 % level of significance. Likewise, observation of Chart 2 (graph of
CAER from day-30 to day +30) confirms the significant reaction of the risk-adjusted returns of
the sample of firms tested to the announcement of stock repurchases.
Chart 1: AVERAGE EXCESS RETURN OVER EVENT PERIOD
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Chart 2: CUMULATIVEAVERAGE EXCESS RETURN OVER EVENT PERIOD
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Chart 2 shows a decrease in stock price for the sample of firms announcing a stock
repurchase from day -30 to the announcement date followed by an immediate and significant
price increase on the announcement day 0. Following the announcement, the sample of
repurchase firms maintained and slightly elevated the significant positive impact on return
(apparently triggered by the news) for the majority of the event period to day +21. The evidence
supports the alternative hypothesis H1 1: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample
of firms announcing stock repurchases is significantly affected by this type of information on the
announcement date. For the sample of flITils analyzed, an investor is unable to earn an above
normal risk adjusted return by acting on the public announcement of a stock repurchase. After
the announcement date, the firms' stock prices trended upward slightly to day +21. This is

consistent with the semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis, which states that the stock
price reflects all publicly available information. Results here suggest that stock repurchase
announcements illicit si gnificant positive stock price reactions at the semi-strong level of market
efficiency.

CONCLUSION

This study tested the effect of stock repurchase announcements on the stock price's risk
adjusted rate of return for a sample of 85 firms. These stocks were traded on the NYSE, AMEX,
or the NASDAQ. Using standard risk adjusted event study methodology with the market model,
the study analyzed 35,870 recent observations on eighty-five publicly traded firms and the
corresponding S&P 500 market index. Appropriate statistical tests of significance were
conducted. Results show a negative market reaction prior to the firms' stock repurchase
announcement and a positive reaction on and after the announcement. Findings support efficient
market theory at the semi-strong form level as documented by Fama (1970). Stock repurchase
announcements illicit significant positive stock price reactions at the semi-strong level of market
efficiency.
Specifically, for this study the announcement of stock repurchase is viewed with a mixed
signal, negative before the announcement and positive afterwards. Investors appear unsure as to
management's motivation implied by the repurchase decision. Unlike previous literature on this
issue, there is no consistent positive signal associated with the repurchase announcements
observed in this study. Evidence here is mixed possibly due to sample selection bias or the
behavioral challenge to efficient market theory. This study suggests that the market is not
efficient with respect to announcements of stock repurchases in the short term. Results here
question the strength of market efficiency and may offer additional evidence in support of the
behavioral challenge to efficient market theory.
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